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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TURTLE ISLAND FOODS SPC CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
MICHAEL G. STRAIN, NO. 20-00674-BAJ-EWD
in his official capacity as Commissioner
of Agriculture and Forestry

RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court are the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 36; Doc. 37). The Motions are opposed. (Doc. 39; Doc. 45). Plaintiff filed a Reply
Brief. (Doc. 46). Following a hearing on the matter, the parties filed supplemental
briefing. (Doc. 51; Doc. 52). For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs Motion is
GRANTED and Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts

This case concerns Louisiana's 2019 Act No. 273, entitled the "Truth in
Labeling of Food Products Act," Louisiana Rev. Stat. §§ 3:4741-4746. (Doc. 37-1, ^ 1;
Doc. 45-1; Doc. 36-2, ^ 1; Doc. 39-1, ^ 1). The Act was signed into law on

June 11, 2019, with an effective date of October 1, 2020. (Doc. 37-1, H 1; Doc. 45-1).
The Act provides:
B. No person shall intentionally misbrand or misrepresent any food

product as an agricultural product through any activity including:
(1) Affixing a label to a food product that is false or misleading.
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(2) Selling a food product under the name of an agricultural product.
(3) Representing a food product as an agricultural product for which
a definition and standard of identity has been provided by the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.,
unless:

(a) The food product conforms to the definition and standard.
(b) The label of the food product bears the name of the food
specified in the definition and standard and includes the
common names of optional ingredients other than spices,
flavoring, and coloring present in the food as regulations
require.

(4) Representing a food product as meat or a meat product when the
food product is not derived from a harvested beef, port, poultry,
alligator, farm-raised deer, turtle, domestic rabbit, crawfish, or
shrimp carcass.

(5) Representing a food product as rice when the food product is not
rice.

(6) Representing a food product as beef or a beef product when the
food product is not derived from a domesticated bovine.

(7) Representing a food product as pork or a pork product when the
food product is not derived from a domesticated swine.

(8) Representing a food product as poultry when the food product is
not derived from domesticated birds.
(9) Utilizing a term that is the same as or deceptively similar to a
term that has been used or defined historically in reference to a
specific agricultural product.

(10) Affixing a label that uses the term rice" in the name of the food
product when the food product is not rice or derived from rice.

(11) Representing a cell cultured food product as a meat product.
(12) Representing a food product as sugar when it is not an unaltered
plant-based simple sugar or sucrose.

Case 3:20-cv-00674-BAJ-EWD

Document 53

03/28/22 Page 3 of 20

La. Rev. Stat. § 3:4744(B).
Plaintiff produces and packages plant-based meat products that are marketed
and sold in Louisiana and nationwide. (Doc. 37-1, K 5; Doc. 45-1). Plaintiffs labels
and marketing materials clearly state that its products are plant-based, meatless,
vegetarian, or vegan, and accurately list the products ingredients. (Doc. 37-1,
n 6-7; Doc. 45-1).

In response to the Act, Plaintiff has refrained from using certain words and
images on marketing materials and packages and has removed videos from its

website and social media. (Doc. 37-1, ^ 11; Doc. 45-1). It would be "incredibly
expensive for Plaintiff to create specialized labels for products sold in Louisiana or
to change its labeling and marketing nationwide. (Doc. 37-1, K 12; Doc. 45-1).
The Louisiana Legislature designated the Department of Agriculture and
Forestry (LDAF) Commissioner to administer and enforce the provisions of the Act.
(Doc. 36-2,1[ 2; Doc. 39-1, ^ 2). The Commissioner and his staff have formulated rules
and regulations to enforce the provisions of this law. (Doc. 36-2, ^ 3; Doc. 39-1, ^[ 3).
To date, the Commissioner has not sought to enforce the provisions of the Act.
(Doc. 36-2, K 4; Doc. 39-1, ^ 4).

No federal agency has brought any enforcement action against Plaintiff for the
misleading use of "meat" or related terms to describe plant-based meats based on its

food labels or marketing materials. (Doc. 37-1, T[ 10; Doc. 45-1). The LDAF has not
received any complaints from consumers about Plaintiffs labels. (Doc. 37-1, ^[ 8;
Doc. 45-1). The LDAF has also not received any complaints from consumers about
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labels for plant-based meat products or cell cultured food products, and the State of
Louisiana has not investigated any such labels. (Doc. 37-1, 1) 9; Doc. 45-1).

Defendant has reviewed Plaintiffs labels and determined that they do not
violate the Act. (Doc. 36-2, 1[ 5; Doc. 39-1, T| 5). Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has
not been cited for violating the Act or threatened with enforcement. (Doc. 36-2, ^f 6).
Plaintiff disputes that it has not been threatened with enforcement because it avers
that the statute itself is a threat. (Doc. 39-1, K 6).
B. Procedural History
On October 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, asserting
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a). (Doc. 1, K 7). The parties then filed
cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 36; Doc. 37).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court may grant summary judgment only if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine"

if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the
nonmoving party. Anderson, v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When
ruling on motions for summary judgment, courts are required to view all inferences

drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Coleman

v. Hous. Indep. School Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).

4

Case 3:20-cv-00674-BAJ-EWD

Document 53

03/28/22 Page 5 of 20

To survive summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party must do more
than allege an issue of material fact: "Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to

go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial." Auguster v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402

(5th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). "Rule 56
does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of
evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment. Ragas v.

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). A party that fails to present competent evidence opposing a motion
for summary judgment risks dismissal on this basis alone. E.g., Broussard v.

Oryx Energy Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (E.D. Tex. 2000) CTlaintiff produced no
genuine issue of material fact to prevent the granting of Defendant s Motion, and
therefore, the Court could grant Defendant s Motion for Summary Judgment on this
basis alone/).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Standing
Before the Court may proceed to the merits of this case, the Court must
determine whether Plaintiff has standing to challenge the Act. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff does not have standing because Plaintiffs labels are neither misleading nor
proscribed- by the Act. (Doc. 45, p. 3). Accordingly, Defendant contends that Plaintiff
does not have an "actual injury" that is redressable by the Court. (Id.). Because there
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is no concrete dispute between the parties, Defendant asserts that the Court does not

have jurisdiction. (Id.).
Plaintiff responds that it has standing for three main reasons: (1) the plain
language of the Act applies to Plaintiffs speech; (2) Plaintiff has a reasonable fear of
enforcement; and (3) Plaintiffs intended commercial speech has been chilled by the
Act. (Doc. 39, p. 3-5).

i. Legal Standard
To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an injury in fact that
is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent ; (2) is fairly traceable to the

defendant's actions; and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Barilla
v. City of Hous., Tex., 13 F.4th 427, 431 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
In pre-enforcement cases alleging a violation of the First Amendment's

Free Speech Clause, the Supreme Court has recognized that chilled speech or
self-censorship is an injury sufficient to confer standing. Barilla, 13 F.4th at 431
(citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965); Va. v. Am. Booksellers
Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988); accord Ctr. For Individual Freedom, v. Carnzouche,

449F.3d655, 660 (5th Cir. 2006); Hous. Chron. Publ'g Co. v. City of League City,
488 F.3d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 2007)). A plaintiff bringing such a challenge need not have
experienced "an actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action" to establish

standing. Susan B. Anthony List u. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (citing Steffel
u. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)). Instead, such a plaintiff may demonstrate an

6
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injm'y-in-fact by showing that it: (1) has an 'intention to engage in a course of conduct

arguably affected with a constitutional interest'; (2) its intended future conduct is
arguably proscribed by the policy at issue; and (3) the threat of future enforcement of
the challenged policy is substantial. Barilla, 13 F.4th at 432-34. (citing
Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020) (alterations in original)
(quoting Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 161-64; citing Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). The Court will analyze
each of the three prongs in turn.
ii. Discussion

a. Whether Plaintiff Intends To Engage In A Course Of

Conduct Arguably Affected With A Constitutional
Interest'

First, Plaintiff asserts that its conduct constitutes protected commercial
speech and is therefore affected with a constitutional interest/ (Doc. 52, p. 3).
Defendant does not appear to dispute that this case involves a constitutional interest.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs intended conduct is arguably affected
with a constitutional interest.

b. Whether Intended Future Conduct Is Arguably
Proscribed By The Policy At Issue
Second, Plaintiff argues that "both its current and intended speech is
proscribed by the Act because the Act prohibits representing plant-based products Q
using terms the Act defines as applying only to products derived from slaughtered
animals, without providing any safe harbor for labels that make clear that products
are derived from plants." (Doc. 52, p. 3).

7
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Defendant contends that Plaintiffs intended future conduct—labeling of its
products—is not proscribed by the Act. (Doc. 36-1, p. 8). Indeed, the Commissioner

has determined that nine of Plaintiffs labels for currently marketed products do not
violate the Act1 (Doc. 36-1, p. 8; Doc. 39, p. 6).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented a basis to find that its future
conduct is arguably proscribed by the Act. The Act specifically prohibits any person
from intentionally misbrand[ing] or misrepresent[ing] any food product as an
agricultural product through any activity including:"
(2) Selling a food product under the name of an agricultural product.
(3) Representing a food product as an agricultural product for which
a definition and standard of identity has been provided by the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.,
unless:

(a) The food product conforms to the definition and standard.
(b) The label of the food product bears the name of the food
specified in the definition and standard and includes the
common names of optional ingredients other than spices,

flavoring, and coloring present in the food as regulations
require.

(4) Representing a food. product as meat or a meat product when the
food product is not derived from a harvested beef, port, poultry,
alligator, farm-raised deer, turtle, domestic rabbit, crawfish, or
shrimp carcass.

(6) Representing a food product as beef or a beef product when the
food product is not derived from a domesticated bovine.

1 The labels that the Commissioner has determined do not violate the Act include nine of
Plaintiffs labels submitted to the Court. These nine labels are merely illustrative and do not
include all of Plaintiffs product labels. (Doc. 52, p. 4).
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(7) Representing a food product as pork or a pork product when the
food product is not derived from a domesticated swine.

(8) Representing a food product as poultry when the food product is
not derived from domesticated birds.
(9) Utilizing a term that is the same as or deceptively similar to a
term that has been used or defined historically in reference to a
specific agricultural product.

(11) Representing a cell cultured food product as a meat product.
La. Rev. Stat. § 3:4744(B). The Act defines "meat" as:
Meat means a portion of a beef, pork, poultry, alligator, farm-raised
deer, turtle, domestic rabbit, crawfish, or shrimp carcass that is edible
by humans but does not include a:
(a) Synthetic product derived from a plant, insect, or other source.

(b) Cell cultured food product grown in a laboratory from animal
cells.

La. Stat. Ann. §3:4743(10).
Plaintiffs use of meat terms to define non-meat products is arguably

proscribed conduct according to the plain language of the Act outlined above.
c. Whether The Threat Of Future Enforcement Of The

Challenged Policy Is Substantial
Accordingly, whether Plaintiff has standing turns on whether the threat of
future enforcement of the Act is substantial. Plaintiff argues that the threat of future
enforcement is substantial, relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Barilla v. City of
Houston, Texas. 13 F.4th 427, 433 (5th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff argues that there, the
Circuit held that courts must assume a credible threat of prosecution in the absence

9
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of compelling contrary evidence. (Doc. 52, p. 4 (citing Barilla, 13 F.4th at 432)).
Plaintiff also relies on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves to
argue that declarations by enforcing officials showing a lack of intention to penalize
plaintiff s intended conduct in a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge do not
qualify as compelling contrary evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of a

threat of future enforcement. 979 F.3d 319, 338 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised
(Oct. 30, 2020). (Doc. 52, p. 5).
Contrarily, Defendant argues that the threat of future enforcement is not
substantial, relying on the following evidence. First, the Commissioner submitted an
Affidavit attesting that nine of Plaintiff s current labels do not violate the Act because
they are neither misleading nor do they constitute a misbranding.2 (Doc. 36-3, ^[ 5;
Doc. 39, p. 6). Second, the Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff has never been cited
for violating the Act. (Doc. 36-1, p. 8). Third, the Commissioner has agreed not to

enforce the Act during the pendency of this lawsuit. (Id. at p. 6). Finally, the
Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff faces no threat of enforcement as the LDAF will
not retroactively determine that Plaintiffs nine labels violate the Act. (Doc. 51, p. 5).
Plaintiff responds that Defendants assurances do not remove the threat of
future enforcement because the labels that the Commissioner has determined do not

2 Specifically, Defendant argues that "Commissioner Strain has formally established that
[PlaintiffJ will not face any threat of civil enforcement (there is no criminal penalty here) of
the [Act] because [Plaintiffs] labels presented to the [Cjourt are not violative of that law."
(Doc. 51, p. 5). In his Affidavit, the Commissioner attested that the LDAF reviewed the labels
that Plaintiff presented to the Court and determined that they do not violate the Act.
(Doc. 36-3, ^ 5). The Commissioner attested that LDAF does not find [the labels] misleading
nor do they constitute a misbranding." {Id.).

10
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violate the Act are merely illustrative, and do not include all of Plaintiffs product
labels. (Doc. 52, p. 4). Indeed, although the Commissioner has found that the nine

labels Plaintiff submitted to the Court do not violate of the Act, the Commissioner
"makes no representations as to whether any other label of [Plaintiff] would be
violative of the provisions of the Act/' (Doc. 36-1, n.l).

Plaintiff argues that it has a "serious intent to engage in proscribed conduct
because it would have used certain marketing words and images but for the existence
of the Act. (Doc. 52, p. 3; Doc. 37-1, K1[ 11-12; Doc. 45-1). In response to the Act,

Plaintiff has already refrained from using certain words and images on marketing
materials and packages and has removed videos from its website and social media.

(Doc. 37-1, T( 11; Doc. 45-1). Additionally, Plaintiff has a "depth of marketing" that
was not included in Plaintiffs illustrative list of labels provided to the Court that the
State may determine runs afoul of the Act, including years of online marketing."

(Doc 52, p. 5). Defendant does not dispute that it would be "incredibly expensive" for
Plaintiff to create specialized labels for products sold in Louisiana or to change its
labeling and marketing nationwide. (Doc. 37-1, ^ 12; Doc. 45-1).
The Court finds that the threat of future enforcement is substantial. "In pre"
enforcement cases alleging a violation of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause,

the Supreme Court has recognized that chilled speech or self [-] censorship is an injury
sufficient to confer standing." Barilla v. City of Houston, Texas. 13 F.4th 427, 431-32

(5th Cir. 2021). Here, Plaintiff has engaged in self "censorship as it has already
changed its marketing practices in Louisiana in response to the Act. Additionally,

11
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Plaintiffs speech has been chilled by the Act. The Commissioner's determination that
nine of Plaintiff labels do not violate the Act does not persuade otherwise. The Court
does not doubt that the Commissioner will uphold his qualified agreement that he
will not seek enforcement of the Act regarding these labels. However, the

Commissioner expressly acknowledged that he may find Plaintiffs other labels
objectionable.3 Accordingly, Plaintiff has no way of knowing whether its additional
current or future labels might violate the Act.4 Indeed, a new Commissioner may take

a different approach in response to the Act and seek enforcement against Plaintiff for
its vast array of labeling not included in its "illustrative" labels included in its
Complaint. In making this finding, the Court finds the following opinion informative.
In Speech First, the Fifth Circuit found that the defendant-university's policies
likely established a substantial threat of future enforcement against those in a class
whose speech was arguably restricted.5 979 F.3d 319, 338 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised
(Oct. 30, 2020). The Circuit emphasized that this likelihood is all that is necessary to

3 Indeed, even if the Commissioner reviewed all of Plaintiffs current labels, the threat of
future enforcement would still be substantial. The Commissioner's Affidavit specifically
makes no representation regarding whether Plaintiffs additional current labels or future
labels might violate the Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff may suffer a chilling effect in bringing new
products to market, or in maintaining current products on the market that appear to run
afoul of the Act.
4 The Commissioner s qualified disavowal of any future intention to enforce the Act against
Plaintiff appears arbitrary, as the plain language of the Act appears to proscribe Plaintiffs
conduct. IVIoreover, the Commissioner s Affidavit to the Court does not have the binding effect
of a regulation. Not only could the current Commissioner change his mind, but a new
Commissioner could take a different course of action.

5 The Court notes that this decision was made at the preliminary injunction phase, and the
instant case is decided on summary judgment. Noting this distinction, the Court finds the
case informative.
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establish the final element of an injury-in-fact for standing.
There, the court considered the defendant's "contrary evidence" to the

presumption of enforcement, including declarations establishing the defendant's lack
of intention to penalize the intended conduct at issue and an absence of past

enforcement of the policy. Id. at 336. The Fifth Circuit found that the declarations
together with the absence of past enforcement was not compelling evidence. ("[T]his
evidence is not compelling."). Id. The Circuit emphasized that the officials' disavowal
of any future intention to enforce the policies at issue simply reinforced the open"

ended language in those policies, stating:
Even more to the point, if there is no history of inappropriate or
unconstitutional past enforcement, and no intention to pursue discipline

against students under these policies for speech that is protected by the
First Amendment, then why maintain the policies at all? At least, why
maintain the plethora of potential sanctions?
Id. at 337-38 (Surely it reasonably implies that the University will protect and
enforce its verbal harassment policy as far as possible, but the distance to that
horizon is unknown by the University and unknowable to those regulated by it/?). The
court also expounded that "[p]ast enforcement of speech-related policies can assure
standing, but Q a lack of past enforcement does not alone doom a claim of standing.

Id. (citing Carmouche, 449 F.3d at 660 ("Controlling precedent . . . establishes that a
chilling of speech because of the mere existence of an allegedly vague or overbroad

[law] can be sufficient injury to support standing. )).
The Court finds this case to be similar. Because Plaintiff has demonstrated a
"serious intent to engage in proscribed conduct, Plaintiffs desired conduct is

13
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arguably proscribed by the Act, and the threat of future enforcement is substantial,
Plaintiff has a justiciable injury. Barilla v. City of Houston, Texas. 13 F.4th 427,
432-35 (5th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff has standing to challenge the Act.6
B. Whether the Act is an Unconstitutional Violation of Plaintiffs
First Amendment Right to Free Expression
i. Legal Standard
Although the Constitution protects commercial speech, that protection is more
limited than for most other forms of speech. Express Oil Change, L.L.C. v.

6 The Court's finding is bolstered by the Eighth Circuit s holding in Turtle Island Foods,
SPC v. Thompson. 992 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 2021). There, the Eighth Circuit found that
Tofurky had standing to challenge a Missouri statute that criminalizes misrepresenting a
product as meat that is not derived from harvested production livestock or poultry. Id. The
Eighth Circuit applied the same standard discussed here, noting that "[t]his is a forgiving
standard) satisfied so long as [plaintiffs'] intended future conduct is arguably . . . proscribed
by the statute it wishes to challenge.'" Id. at 699. The Eighth Circuit found that although it
was not clear whether all of Tofurky's intended commercial speech would be proscribed by
the Missouri statute, it was at least arguable at the early preliminary injunction stage of
the litigation. Id. at 700. The court also emphasized that because plaintiffs' claim was "largely
a legal question" and involves the chill of allegedly protected- First Amendment expression,"
it was ripe for adjudication. Id.
In Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas found that Tofurky had standing to challenge a similar statute in Arkansas.
424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 566 (E.D. Ark. 2019). There, the State argued that Tofurky did not have
standing to challenge the Act because it was not faced with a credible threat of prosecution.
The court found that "[t]he State's arguments misunderstand what Tofurky must show to
demonstrate appropriate standing." Id. at 566. In a pre-enforcement suit, "a plaintiff satisfies
the injury-in" fact requirement, and thus has standing, where [it] alleges an intention to
engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed
by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder. Id. Finding that
Tofurky had standing, the court emphasized that:
[TJhere is nothing stopping the State from simply changing its mind and
deciding to prosecute Tofurky during the pendency of this litigation .. . Thus,
the credible threat of incurring significant liability for continued actions in
violation of [the] Act Q demonstrates sufficient injury and ripeness to grant
Tofurky standing. . .

Id. at 567. The court made this finding at the preliminary injunction phase.
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Miss. Bd. Of Licensure for Pro. Eng'rs & Surveyors, 916 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2019)
(citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). The test for when
a government actor may regulate commercial speech was set forth in Central Hudson:
"(I) whether the commercial speech at issue concerns unlawful activity or is

misleading; (2) whether the governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the
challenged regulation directly advances the government's asserted interest; and

(4) whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to further the
government's interest. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n of N. Y.,

447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). "Each of these latter three inquiries"—whether (1) 'the
asserted governmental interest is substantial, (2) the regulation 'directly advances'
that interest, and (3) the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve

that interest'—must be answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found
constitutional. Express Oil Change, L.L.C., 916 F.3d at 492 (citing Thompson v.

W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002)).
"The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the

burden of justifying it." Express Oil Change, L.L.C, 916 F.3d at 487 (citing Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983)). This "burden is a (heav/ one,"
and may not be satisfied <by mere speculation or conjecture[.]?" Id.
ii. Discussion

Applying the Central Hudson, test, the Act impermissibly restricts commercial
speech because the speech at issue is not misleading, and while the governmental

15
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interest is likely substantial, the Act is more extensive than necessary to further the
Government's interest. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.

a. Wliether the Commercial Speech at Issue is

Misleading
First, the Court must determine whether the commercial speech at issue is
misleading. Cent, Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp,, 447 U.S. at 566. Here, the parties agree

that Plaintiffs speech is not misleading. Defendant attested in an Affidavit that the
LDAF does not find [Plaintiffs labels] misleading nor do they constitute a
misbranding. (Doc. 45, p. 1-2). Accordingly, the first prong of the Central Hudson
test is met.

b. Whether the Governmental Interest is Substantial
Second, the Court must determine whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. The purpose of the Act "is to protect consumers from misleading and

false labeling of food products that are edible by humans." La. Rev. Stat § 3:4742.
Plaintiff agrees that the Government undoubtedly has an interest in preventing
consumer deception, the ostensible interest behind the Act. (Doc. 37-2, p. 17).
Accordingly, the second prong of the Central Hudson test is met.

c. Whether the Challenged Regulation Directly
Advances the Government's Asserted Interest

Third, Plaintiff argues that the Act fails to directly advance the State's
interest. (Doc. 37-2, p. 17). Plaintiff argues that the State cannot show that the Act
advances its interest of preventing consumer confusion because there is no evidence
that consumers are confused by plaut-based or cell-cultured meat product labeling.

16
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(M). In support of its argument, Plaintiff cites the lack of complaints, investigations,
or documents reflecting consumer confusion.7 {Id.}. Plaintiff also cites the Declaration

of Jareb Gleckel, attorney and author of an empirical study entitled Are Cojzsnmers
Really Confused by Plant-Based Food Labels? An Empirical Study. (Doc. 37-4).8 (Id.).
Plaintiff argues that the State cannot point to any studies, evidence, or statistics
concerning consumer confusion about plant-based or cell-cultured meat products.
(Doc. 37-2, p. 17).

Defendant responds that the State has chosen to prohibit the intentional
misrepresentation and misbranding of certain food products to directly advance its
substantial interest of protecting consumers. (Doc. 36-1, p. 16).

Plaintiff presents compelling evidence indicating that consumers are not
confused by its labeling. In response, Defendant fails to produce evidence indicating
that consumers are confused by Plaintiffs labeling. Therefore, the Act's limitations
on Plaintiffs commercial speech likely do not directly advance the State's interest of
avoiding consumer confusion. Presumably, the Act may advance the State's interest

in other ways, apart from the instant facts. Regardless of whether the Act directly
advances the State s interest, the Court finds that the Act is more extensive than
necessary to further the State's interest. Accordingly, the outcome is the same.

7 The undisputed facts in this case indicate that the LDA-F has not received, any complaints
from consumers about Plaintiffs labels or about labels for plant-based meat products or cell
cultured food products. The State of Louisiana has not investigated any such labels.
(Doc. 37-1, II 8-9; see generally Doc. 45-1).
8 Plaintiff submitted the article to the Court for its consideration, which was published in the
Journal of Animal and Environmental Law, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring 2021).
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d. Whether the Regulation is No IVtore Extensive than
Necessary to Further the Government's Interest

Fourth, Plaintiff contends that the Act is more extensive than necessary to
serve the State's interest. (Doc. 37-2, p. 18). Plaintiff contends that an alternative,
less restrictive means, such as a disclaimer would be sufficient to protect the public.

(Id.). For instance, Plaintiff contends that the State could "require more prominent
disclosures of the vegan nature of plant-based products, create a symbol to go on the

labeling and packaging of plant-based products indicating their vegan composition,
or require a disclaimer that the products do not contain meat."9 {Id. (citing

Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 576 (E.D. Ark. 2019)).
Defendant responds that the Act "is so narrowly tailored that it prohibits only
misleading labels and misbranding." (Doc. 45, p. 4). Defendant contends that the
prohibitory language in the Act is equally clear and direct: "No person shall
intentionally misbrand. or misrepresent any food product as any agricultural product

through any activity . . ." followed by a specific and detailed description of proscribed
conduct included. La. Rev. Stat. § 3:4744(B). Defendant contends that the Act

9 In Mississippi, Upton's Naturals Co. and the Plant Based Foods Association challenged a
similar law on First Amendment grounds. Upton s Naturals Co., et a.l. v. Phil Bryant, et al.,

No. 3:19-CV-00462-HTW"LRA. Thereafter, the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and
Commerce proposed new regulations that would allow the use of meat terms on the labels of
plant-based food if certain conditions are met. Specifically, the proposed regulations specify
that a plant-based food product wiU- not be considered to be labeled as a "meat" or "meat food
product if one or more of the following terms, or a comparable qualifier, is prominently
displayed on the front of the package: meat free," "meatless," "plant-base d," "veggie-based,"
made from plants, vegetarian, or vegan. See Mississippi Reverses Stance on Plant-Based
M.eat Labeling, NAT'L L. REV., https://www.natlawreview.com/article/mississippi-reversesstance-plant-based-meat-labeling (last visited M.av. 17, 2022). Here, a similar regulation

would be widely applicable, provide clear standards for all regulated persons, and prevent
the arbitrary enforcement (or lack of enforcement) regarding a particular entity or label.
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proscribes only intentional misleading or intentional misbranding, and accordingly,
is not more extensive than necessary to serve the State s interest. (Doc. 36-1, p. 16).

The Fifth Circuit has recognized various "regulatory safeguards" which the
state may impose in place of a total ban on commercial speech. See
Express Oil Change, L.L.C. v. Miss. Bd. of Licensure for Pro. Eng'rs & Surveyors,

916 F.3d 483, 493 (5th Cii\ 2019) ([defendant] fails to address why alternative, lessrestrictive means, such as a disclaimer, would not accomplish its stated goal of

protecting the public."); see also Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 449 (5th Cir. 2009)
("[C]oncernmg the terms "interior design" and "interior designer," [the Fifth Circuit]
held that the State could have eliminated any constitutional challenge here by not
limiting use of the terms interior design' and 'interior designer' but by allowing only
designers who satisfy its licensing qualifications to represent themselves as 'licensed'
interior designers. ).
Defendant has failed to address why alternative, less-restrictive means, such
as a disclaimer, would not accomplish its goal of preventing consumer confusion.

Defendant bears the burden of justifying the instant restriction on commercial
speech. This burden is a 'heavy' one," and may not be "satisfied 'by mere speculation

or conjecture/" Express Oil Change, L.L.C, 916 F.3d at 487 (citations omitted). Here,
Defendant s general argument that the Act does not prohibit Plaintiffs commercial
speech, but only prohibits other misleading speech is not enough to bear its burden.
Defendant has "failed to satisfy the required burden of demonstrating a reasonable
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fit between its regulation and the constitutionally-protected speech." See id. at 493.

Accordingly, the Act is an impermissible restriction on Plaintiffs commercial speech.
Because the Court has reached this conclusion, it need not address whether
the Act is unconstitutionally vague.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 37) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Michael G. Strain's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Act No. 273 is unconstitutional. The
Defendants are enjoined from enforcing the provisions of the Act.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will withhold final judgment
pending Plaintiffs motion for costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54 and Local Civil Rule 54.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ^0 day ofIVEarch, 2022

AJUDGE BRIAN A. (ACK^ON

UNITED STATES DfTW^I
HOT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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